Cold ironing is a technology that provides an effective way of protecting the environment. By plugging into an onshore electricity supply, container ships calling at port can shut down their auxiliary engines while still getting the power they need, particularly to maintain controlled temperatures in refrigerated containers (reefers).This innovative technology has significant environmental benefits, including:
Cold ironing, a technology that provides an effective way of protecting the environment, a CMA CGM statement read. By plugging into an onshore electricity supply, also known as cold ironing, container ships calling at port can shut down their auxiliary engines while still getting the power they need, particularly in order to maintain controlled temperatures in refrigerated containers.
Bhopal, Jan 9 (UNI) A proposal for legislation related to budgetary allocation on the basis of population and mandatory expenditure of the Tribal Sub Plan amount will be presented in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly, Chief Minister Kamal Nath averred on Thursday while presiding over the Scheduled Tribes Advisory Council meeting at Mantralaya, official sources said.Jammu, Jan 9 (UNI) The National Highway Authority of India on Thursday said that FASTag will be mandatory to pay the toll charges at the NH Toll Plazas across the country including those in J K Union Territory from January 14.
NEW DELHI : Dense foggy conditions are set to return in the National Capital Region (NCR) Thursday onwards, as rainfall begins to subside leaving high levels of moisture in the air just above the surface.The latest forecast from India Meteorological Department (IMD) suggests that there is still probability of scattered rains over the north western plains during the next 24 hours until Thursday morning, after which it will begin to decrease. Parts of Uttar Pradesh and Uttrakhand could also witness thunderstorms and lightning during the period.
(This story has not been edited by THE WEEK and is auto generated from PTI)The Week Mobile App
The first German line of defense against colds is usually tea. Brews of all kinds will be prescribed to you by doctors and neighbours alike. Garlic tea, ginger tea, elderberry tea, thyme tea, lime blossom tea and onion tea are all preferred for colds and flus. The extra liquid is meant to help lubricate irritated mucous membranes, and the herbs are believed to soothe coughs or sore throats. Onions
Delhi had recorded the season''s coldest day on Saturday with the minimum temperature dropping to 2.4 degrees Celsius.
Christmas crackdowns have left YouTube hosts in the cold.
Mark Gatiss (of Sherlock Dracula fame) is always one for dark humour in his tales, and is back for another round with Christmas ghost story, Martin s Close.Originally written by M.R. James back in 1911, but is set in the year 1684, covering the weird and ghostly trial of a man named John Martin (Wilf Scolding), who is being tried for the murder of Ann Clark (Jessica Temple).
Key point: For the time being, the MLRS still provides an effective rocket system for U.S. armored units. On February 24, 1991, the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm began. Over the next four days, the soldiers of an international coalition, formed to eject the Iraqi army of Saddam Hussein from the neighboring nation of Kuwait, carried out a whirlwind offensive that quickly overwhelmed their foe. During this time, tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers were taken prisoner. Many of them, arms thrust upward in a sign of surrender, said one thing when they were taken into custody: No more steel rain. For weeks before the ground attack, these men had been systematically pummeled by the entire range of weaponry available to their opponents B 52 bombing strikes, air attacks using tons of precision smart weapons, plus many more thousands of tons of traditional unguided bombs and rockets. Added to this was the close air support of fighter bomber aircraft and attack helicopters. Artillery barrages dropped down on them by the dozens and hundreds, adding yet another level to the pounding they received. The cries of no more steel rain applied to none of these, however. Instead, it was the nickname of a deadly new artillery weapon seeing its debut in combat: the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System, or MLRS. Batteries of these weapons had been deployed to the Gulf with U.S. and British forces, who used them to blanket their target areas with hundreds of rockets releasing thousands of explosive submunitions, or bomblets, that devastated armored vehicles, trucks, equipment, and men. Volleys of rockets pounded the hapless Iraqi troops and paved the way for the sweeping infantry and armor assaults that followed. The MLRS proved itself alongside such other late Cold War weapons as the M1 Abrams tank, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and AH64 Apache helicopter. Like these weapons, the MLRS had its origins in the 1970s development programs of the post Vietnam era. The MLRS Concept Takes Shape During the late 1960s and early 1970s, America s involvement in the Vietnam War drew most of the focus away from the traditional enemies of the time, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. As the United States gradually withdrew from the conflict in Asia, its attention once again returned to Eastern Europe, and the U.S. Army was not happy encountering the Russians new claws. The Soviets had taken advantage of America s distraction to build up its conventional forces to unprecedented levels. The Warsaw Pact now sat across the Iron Curtain with tens of thousands of new tanks, armored vehicles, cannons, and rocket artillery pieces. Artillery had always weighed heavily in Soviet planning, and they now had new, longer ranged cannons than most comparable American weapons. The disparity in rocket artillery was even more one sided. Soviet tactics used barrages of thousands of rockets fired from truck mounted multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) such as the BM 21. American artillery was only scantily supplied with rocket launchers, many of them left over from World War II. With some exceptions, U.S. planners heavily favored cannon artillery, primarily for its relative accuracy. Rockets at that time were considered area fire weapons; that is, they were fired en masse at an area of ground where the enemy was thought to be, rather than at a point target such as a bunker or trenchline. Existing rockets simply were not accurate enough for such pinpoint work, although they packed quite a punch and tended to have a terrifying psychological effect on the enemy. The Soviets were willing to saturate a target area with rockets, figuring that some, at least, would find their mark. For American artillerists, weaned on the concepts of accuracy and economy of expenditure in ammunition, large scale use of indiscriminate rockets simply was not palatable. A number of occurrences changed that mindset. In 1973, the Arab Israeli War broke out. Attrition rates in that conflict were far higher than expected, greater than any possible rate of replacement for lost armor and aircraft. One of the more effective Israeli tactics had been to hit enemy Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites with MRLs. The American military establishment noted this. It also noted that in the event of war in Europe, NATO would have to fight outnumbered against a well equipped enemy in intense, destructive combat. After long debate, the U.S. Army finally wrote a requirement for a new rocket launcher in March 1974, calling it the GSRS, or General Support Rocket System. It would be used to engage enemy air defenses and for counterbattery fire, neutralizing opposing artillery. The new launcher would have long range and massive firepower, freeing the cannon units to provide close support to the infantry and armor. Several NATO allies, including the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany, were consulted and agreed to collaborate on the project. Since the Europeans already had looked at a similar system independently, their name was adopted, changing GSRS to MLRS. Design and Development Actual development began in September 1977, undertaken by the Boeing and Vought Aerospace companies, which beat out three other competitors for the contract. Development continued into the 1980s and eventually became the highest priority for the Field Artillery School, which considered it the Army s most spectacular new weapons system. After initial testing proved successful, the MLRS was adopted, with the first production models, designated M270, arriving at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in August 1982. The first operational battery of M270s was formed in March 1983, and the new unit was sent to West Germany the following September. These batteries were composed of three platoons of three launchers each, a total of nine launchers per battery. By 1987, 25 such batteries were in service. The basic M270 was a self propelled armored vehicle that mated two main subcomponents: the Launcher Loader Module (LLM) containing the rocket pods and the hardware needed to load and unload them and the carrier vehicle, essentially an enlarged version of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis. The vehicle was not quite 23 feet long, 9.5 feet wide, and 8.5 feet high. It weighed 52,990 pounds ready for combat. The three man crew sat in a cab above the engine compartment. This cab was armored to protect against small arms fire and artillery fragments. The engine was a Cummins 8 cylinder diesel developing 500 horsepower for a top speed of 40 miles per hour and a range of 483 kilometers. Directly behind the cab was the LLM, which carried two pods of six rockets each, one next to the other. For firing, the LLM raised and rotated to point to the vehicle s side. It could fire single rockets or any number up to its full load of 12 within 60 seconds. The crew consisted of a crew chief, gunner, and driver. The crew chief commanded the vehicle, oversaw firing operations, and performed checks of the other two crewmen. The gunner operated a firing panel to aim and fire the rockets at selected targets. The M270 s computer calculated the data for the rocket s direction of fire, point of impact, and range; these calculations were based on information received digitally via radio or entered manually by the gunner. The driver operated the M270 and performed maintenance. The heart and purpose of the M270 were its munitions. The basic rocket was the M26, with a range of 32 kilometers. It carried 644 grenade sized submunitions. A single M270 could blanket a 600 square meter area with 7,728 bomblets, devastating to men, material, and light vehicles, with a limited effect on armored vehicles. One battery of MLRS firing a complete volley of 108 rockets had the equivalent firepower of 33 battalions of cannon artillery. These rockets were packaged in pods of six rounds each. Rockets were only part of the picture, however. The M270 also fired the M39 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile, each launcher carrying two missiles in place of the normal 12 rockets. The ATACMS carried 950 bomblets and had a range of 165 kilometers, giving MLRS the ability to range deep in enemy territory, hitting command posts, logistics depots, air defenses, and assembly areas for advancing units. ATACMS started development in 1985 and was rushed into service for Desert Storm. The MLRS Doctrine The doctrine for the use of MLRS sought to take advantage of its mobility and firepower. To avoid the expected Soviet counterbattery fire, M270s would spread out individually and hide themselves until needed for a mission. The launcher would then move to a firing position, launch its rockets, and immediately move away, hopefully before the Soviets could calculate the launch point using radar and fire on it. The M270 crew would then proceed to a reloading point, load fresh rocket pods, and move to a completely new hiding position near a different firing point. This would prevent the enemy from destroying the valuable launchers as they poured volley after volley into the advancing Soviet armored hordes. Fortunately for all concerned, such combat never happened before the Cold War came to an end. Instead, the MLRS would be called upon in the deserts of the Middle East. When the Iraqi Army conquered Kuwait in 1990, hundreds of thousands of American troops were sent to Saudi Arabia, first to defend against further Iraqi aggression and then to free Kuwait from its occupiers. They took with them 89 MLRS launchers. The baptism of fire for the M270 came on January 17, 1991. That day, Battery A of the 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery was traveling west on a highway called Tapline Road, en route to an assembly area. At 1620 hours, an order came to fire its ATACMS missiles at SAM sites that posed a danger to planned B 52 air strikes. Although it took several hours to coordinate clear airspace for the missile s trajectories, at 0042 on January 18, two missiles roared from their launchers, destroying both SAM sites. Battery A fired six more missiles that day targeting more of the Iraqi air defense network. 1 2 Next View the discussion thread. copy; Copyright 2019 Center for the National Interest All Rights Reserved
In the pantheon of American military commanders, Curtis LeMay stands out as one of the more controversial individuals. His gruff, no nonsense, yet pragmatic approaches to strategic bombardment and airpower leave most people either admiring his aptitude or loathing his methods. The author of the Japanese fire raids in the closing months of World War II, LeMay s actions provide one of the clearest examples of total war and unrestricted bombing. His ability to get the most out of his command became a hallmark of his leadership acumen. General Curtis LeMay (A.Y. Owen Getty) With the dropping of the atomic weapons from strategic bombers, many believed warfare had entered a new age rendering conventional military operations obsolete or at least a very distant secondary to air centric campaigns. Subscribing to this new vision, LeMay took charge of Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1948 and served as its commander for an unprecedented nine years until 1957. During this time, he oversaw Strategic Air Command s growth not only in terms of size and numbers but also in increased lethality and capability. Commanding the most destructive military force ever assembled, LeMay functioned as the catalyst and the fulcrum, which made Strategic Air Command a primary symbol of American military might. With this view of the future, LeMay calculated that the very nature of warfare in the atomic age had to be based on offensive actions with no room for defensively based policies. Trevor Albertson s Winning Armageddon addresses how and why LeMay viewed an atomic preemptive attack as a viable strategy in the emerging Cold War environment. Following the war, a new paradigm developed, which argued the initiator of an atomic aerial assault had a distinct advantage over the defender or a retaliatory strike. Fearing Strategic Air Command s fleet of bombers might be caught on the ground and vulnerable to a Soviet attack, LeMay believed the same risk existed regarding American national infrastructure and its cities. Given this possibility, LeMay insisted the only good defense was a good offense. However, LeMay fortunately failed to convince the nation s leadership to change the stated policy regarding nuclear weapons. In this vein, Albertson s main argument addresses LeMay s quest for a preemptive attack policy and his advocacy of it to the nation s leadership. In this vein, the author comprehensively addresses the Strategic Air Command commander s push for preemption despite resistance from other elements of the defense establishment and the Federal government. From LeMay s cold warrior perspective, a preemptive policy was the only viable method to ensure Strategic Air Command s combat capability while guaranteeing the nation s safety before the Soviets possibly destroyed them both, most worryingly in a kind of surprise attack akin to Pearl Harbor. Albertson, a former Air Force intelligence officer and former Air Command and Staff College instructor, demonstrates a full understanding of Strategic Air Command, the Air Force, and their roles in the early cold war years in the work s 227 pages. His technical discussion in five well constructed chapters makes for not only a fast read, but an entertaining one. With well annotated endnotes and extensive bibliography, Alberston shows a mastery of the topic only a few academics in this field can match. The work is largely a collection of the Strategic Air Command commander s actions and words encouraging a preemptive policy in both public and classified venues. Loaded with quotes, speeches, and references by LeMay advocating this policy, the author makes a clear and well documented assessment of the Strategic Air Command commander s viewpoint regarding nuclear preemption. Using primary source material, Albertson sets a high bar for works of this nature. Instead of using well trodden secondary sources, the author dug extensively in various archives to support his argument. Albertson also provides new insights into LeMay s offensive mindset. While addressing LeMay s strategic imperative, the author also delves into his effective leadership focusing on troop welfare, quality of life, and realistic training a point many treatises on LeMay fail to address. LeMay consistently demonstrated his concern for the people in his command even if it was only a way to increase performance. Albertson does a credible job of addressing what some might see as the Strategic Air Command commander s use of a softer side to foster the best performance possible. As the book addresses LeMay s advocacy for preemptive strategy almost singularly, the detour regarding troop welfare initiatives is a welcome addition. Given the work s focus on LeMay s push for a preemptive strategy, the author might have addressed more of the challenges Strategic Air Command faced early under LeMay s tenure. When LeMay took over in October 1948, the command lacked much of an atomic capability. Although the book subtly hints via the subtitle this is a treatise of the command, a discussion regarding the development of Strategic Air Command s capability quickly falls to the wayside. Instead, the book maintains its focus on preemption and LeMay s drive for its acceptance. While the author mentions this in his preface, the singular thrust regarding preemption omits discussion of the myriad of problems LeMay had to fix in addition to troop morale. Early on, Strategic Air Command suffered from a lack of ready airframes, maintenance efforts, training, and competence at almost every level. Inclusion of these efforts might have underscored and even highlighted LeMay s efforts to build a preemptive capable force. Despite this omission, the book is an excellent contribution to the historiography of the early Cold War, Strategic Air Command, and LeMay, making it a must for any student of the cold war. Albertson helps provide more insight into Strategic Air Command leadership during LeMay s tenure while illustrating the commander s thought process and quiet, yet aggressive, style of leadership. The author s excellent use of primary sources adroitly illustrate his thesis and fills a void in the current historiography. The book is a worthy and needed addition to the current historiography regarding the Cold War and strategic nuclear bombardment. John M. Curatola is a professor of history at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author s alone and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article first appeared at Real Clear Defense. Image: Flickr. View the discussion thread. copy; Copyright 2019 Center for the National Interest All Rights Reserved
The agency has published a list of the most common OTC drugs under their brand names and drug types and split them into Go and No Go lists. In general, any medication that has a sedative effect is on the bad list and that encompasses most of the popular cold and flu remedies. However, brand names are not an accurate guide because different types of products under the same brand can contain different drugs. Cold remedies are the most common types of drug impairment found in crash investigations and the FAA says anyone in doubt about the safety of their elixir of choice should contact their AME. If you choose to fly on medication, be certain that it will not impair safety, the agency said. Do not simply hope for the best.
Hubble Space Telescope, which belongs to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA), has recently captured a comet 2I Borisov streaking through our solar system on its way back into interstellar space. Borisov, the only second interstellar object known to have passed through the Solar System, is one of the fastest comets ever seen.In a statement, spacetelescope.org said, ”The image is Hubble ''s revisit observation of the comet near its closest approach to the Sun. There it was subjected to a greater degree of heating than it had ever experienced, after spending most of its life in the extreme cold of interstellar space. ”
Climate Change is warming the planet and creating weather patterns that can cause to colder weather. Global warming can seem like an abstract concept when the thermometer is dropping and the ice is building up on your car windshield. But the counterintuitive fact is that they are connected. Weather models show that our increasingly warm planet is causing unstable day to day anomalies across the globe, and some of those are causing colder temperatures.
Key point: A true turning point in the war against the Nazis. January 1945 with World War II in its sixth year found the Allied armies going on the offensive after the Battle of the Bulge, but they were still west of the Rhine and six weeks behind schedule in their advance toward Germany. Closing to the Rhine was not easy. Although U.S. and French units of Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers Sixth Army Group had reached the western bank around Strasbourg in late 1944, the river proved too difficult to cross. Even if an assault could have been mounted, the Allied forces would have been too far away from the heart of Germany to pose any meaningful threat. The key to eventual victory lay in the central and northern Rhineland, but three factors delayed an advance: the failure of Operation Market Garden, the British American airborne invasion of Holland, the onset of an extremely wet autumn and harsh winter, and the unexpectedly rapid recovery of the German Army in the wake of recent Allied advances. A coordinated Allied campaign proved difficult to achieve. General Omar N. Bradley s U.S. 12th Army Group was licking its wounds after the almost disastrous Ardennes counteroffensive, and it was clear to Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, commander of the British 21st Army Group, that the Americans would not be ready to undertake a major offensive for some time. Despite its vast reserve of manpower, unlike the critically depleted British Army, the U.S. Army had become seriously deficient of infantry replacements. Monty made the first move. Meanwhile, on January 12, the Soviet Army launched a long awaited, massive offensive from Warsaw toward the River Oder and Berlin. This was just in time, thought Montgomery and General Dwight D. Ike Eisenhower, the Allied supreme commander. By the end of the month, the Russians were only 50 miles from the German capital. While the Americans were recovering, it devolved on the 21st Army Group, still supported by Lt. Gen. William H. Texas Bill Simpson s U.S. Ninth Army, to take over the battle as soon as winter loosened its grip. Monty and Ike agreed that the next stage should be to break through the Germans formidable Siegfried Line and close up to the left bank of the Rhine. The main objective was the historic city of Wesel, on the opposite side of the great river in flat country just north of the Ruhr Valley. It was here that Montgomery had originally sought to seize a bridgehead in September 1944, and common sense still favored it. Accordingly, two well knit, almost copybook offensives were planned for February 8, 1945: Operation Veritable on the left flank and Operation Grenade on the right, adjacent to the boundary with Bradley s 12th Army Group. Monty announced that the 21st Army Group s task was to destroy all enemy in the area west of the Rhine from the present forward positions south of Nijmegen (Holland) as far south as the general line Julich Dusseldorf, as a preliminary to crossing the Rhine and engaging the enemy in mobile war to the north of the Ruhr. Three armies would be involved in the offensives: the Canadian First, the British Second, and the U.S. Ninth. Commanding the Canadian force was the distinguished, 57 year old General Henry D.G. Harry Crerar, a World War I artillery veteran and a man of cool judgment and cold nerves. The ration strength of his First Army exceeded 470,000 men, and no Canadian had ever led such a large force. The British Second Army was led by the skilled, unassuming Lt. Gen. Sir Miles Bimbo Dempsey, a 48 year old World War I veteran of the Western Front and Iraq who later acquitted himself well in the Dunkirk evacuation, the Western Desert, Sicily, Italy, and Normandy. Tall, bald, Texas born General Simpson, commanding 300,000 men of the U.S. Ninth Army, had served in the Philippine Insurrection, the 1916 Mexico punitive expedition, and on the Western Front in 1918. Eisenhower said of the 56 year old officer, If Simpson ever made a mistake as an Army commander, it never came to my attention. With 11 divisions and nine independent brigades, the Canadian Army would clear the way in February 1945 up to the town of Xanten; the Ninth Army, with 10 divisions in three corps, would cross the Roer River and move northward to Dusseldorf (Operation Grenade), and the four divisions of the Second Army would attack in the center. Although he was in customary high spirits about the operation, Montgomery knew that it would be no cakewalk. I visited the Veritable area today, he warned Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, on February 6. The ground is very wet, and roads and tracks are breaking up, and these factors are likely to make progress somewhat slow after the operation is launched. Besides expected opposition from at least 10 well entrenched Wehrmacht divisions, the Allied troops would have to face minefields, flooded rivers and terrain, a lack of roads, appalling weather, and tough going in the gloomy, tangled Reichswald and Hochwald forests. Montgomery won final approval for the great dual assault on the Rhine on February 1, and the preparations were hastily finalized under tight security. Strict blackout regulations were enforced, and a cover story was concocted to convince the enemy that the offensive would be in a northerly direction to liberate Holland, rather than an eastern thrust into Germany. Daytime gatherings of troops were forbidden unless under cover; large concentrations of vehicles, weapons, and ammunition were camouflaged or concealed in farmyards, barns, and haystacks, and rubber dummies of tanks and artillery pieces were positioned along an imaginary battle line where they might attract the attention of enemy patrols. Logistical feats were accomplished speedily as thousands of men, vehicles, and equipment were transported to the forward assembly lines. The British and Canadian soldiers worked around the clock. Sappers built and improved 100 miles of road using 20,000 tons of stones, 20,000 logs, and 30,000 pickets, and 446 freight trains hauled 250,000 tons of equipment and supplies to the railheads. It was estimated that the ammunition alone all types, stacked side by side and five feet high would line the road for 30 miles. Engineers constructed five bridges across the River Maas, using 1,880 tons of equipment. The biggest was a 1,280 foot long British designed Bailey bridge. Outside Nijmegen, an airfield was laid in five days for British and Canadian rocket firing Hawker Typhoons, which would support the offensive. Meanwhile, a formidable array of armor and specialized vehicles was assembled. It included Churchill, Cromwell, Centaur, Comet, Valentine, and Sherman heavy and medium tanks; Bren gun carriers, jeeps, half tracks, and armored cars; amphibious Weasel, Buffalo, and DUKW cargo and personnel carriers; and 11 regiments of Hobart s Funnies, Churchills and Shermans fitted with antimine flails, flamethrowers, and bridging equipment. Invented by Maj. Gen. Sir Percy Hobart, these had proved invaluable in the Normandy invasion and the clearing of the flooded Scheldt Estuary by Crerar s army. Under the command of the Canadian First Army, the Veritable offensive was to be spearheaded by the seasoned British XXX Corps led by 49 year old Lt. Gen. Sir Brian G. Horrocks. He returned from leave in England to plunge into preparations for the largest operation he had ever undertaken. A much wounded veteran of Ypres, Siberia, El Alamein, Tunisia, Normandy, and Belgium, the tall, lithe Horrocks nicknamed Jorrocks by his mentor, Montgomery was a charismatic officer who led from the front and was regarded as one of the finest corps commanders of the war. Horrocks regarded Monty s overall plan for the offensive as simplicity itself. The XXX Corps was to attack in a southerly direction from the Nijmegen area with its right on the River Maas and its left on the Rhine. Forty eight hours later, said Horrocks, our old friends, General Simpson s U.S. Ninth Army, were to cross the River Roer and advance north to meet us. The German forces would thus be caught in a vise and be faced with the alternatives, either to fight it out west of the Rhine or to withdraw over the Rhine and then be prepared to launch counterattacks when we ourselves subsequently attempted to cross . In theory, this looked like a comparatively simple operation, but all battles have their problems, and in this case the initial assault would have to smash through a bottleneck well suited to defense and consisting in part of the famous Siegfried Line. Horrocks decided to use the maximum force possible and open Operation Veritable with five divisions, from right to left, in line: the 51st Highland, 53rd Welsh, 15th Scottish, and the 2nd and 3rd Canadian, followed by the 43rd Wessex and Maj. Gen. Sir Alan Adair s proud Guards Armored Division. On the morning of February 4, Horrocks briefed his commanders in the packed cinema in the southern Dutch town of Tilburg. Clad in brown corduroy trousers and a battlefield jacket, the unpretentious general drew a warm response as he crisply outlined the offensive, radiated confidence, and moved from group to group with a friendly and humorous word. Like Montgomery, he made a practice of keeping all ranks informed about operations. 1 2 3 4 Next View the discussion thread. copy; Copyright 2019 Center for the National Interest All Rights Reserved
One should be very careful to keep their dosha in balance as vata (a combination of space and air elements) dominates in winters making the body dry.Use products that are natural and extra nourishing. Look for ingredients like natural shea butter, kokum, coconut and almond butter. Soft ingredients like honey, rose, glycerin, natural cold pressed oils like almond, apricot, jojoba, and sesame are good for the skin.